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 Abstract 
The economic crisis within the EU has had a significant impact on domestic politics in 
the member states, affecting the links between parties and citizens and accentuating the 
tensions parties face between governing responsibility and being responsive to public 
opinion. This paper examines if parties in EU countries have shifted their left-right 
ideological positions during the current crisis and whether such shifts are a direct 
response to the pressures of wider economic conditions or are more affected by changes 
in the preferences of the median voter. Party-based and citizen-based data are examined 
between 2002 and 2015, encompassing both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The main 
findings are that the economic crisis has made parties less responsive to public opinion 
on the left-right dimension and this effect is more pronounced for parties that have been 
in government. 
Keywords: Parties, responsiveness, left-right ideology, economic crisis, European 
Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
The economic crisis in the EU has had a multifaceted impact on domestic politics in the 
member states, reshaping relations between citizens, parties, and political institutions. 
The crisis has clearly affected political representation in those countries worst affected 
by the economic crisis, with governing parties particularly facing difficult and often 
unpopular trade-offs. These parties face the conflicting demands of governing 
responsibly and being responsive to public preferences (Mair 2009, 2013). These trade-
offs have been particularly acute for those Eurozone countries who needed recourse to 
external funding bailouts which came with strict conditionality attached, requiring 
greater fiscal discipline and structural reform. As Mair observed: 
 
The Eurozone debt crisis has highlighted the growing incongruence between the 
democratic functions of representative government (`by the people') and those of 
responsible government (`for the people'). Policy prescriptions no longer seem 
compatible with the politics of representation and contestation. In contemporary 
democracies responsible (or output-oriented) government takes prevalence over 
representative (or input-oriented) government (2009: 4). 
 
Over the longer-term, moreover, the European integration process has impacted 
on and constrained party competition in the member states (Mair 2000). A process of 
programmatic convergence has entailed mainstream parties of right and left moving 
closer, particularly on economic policy, in response to the constraints of EU 
membership and its supranational policy outputs (Dorussen and Nanou 2006; Nanou 
and Dorussen 2013). Given the long-standing impact of the EU on party competition 
and policy feasibility, particularly on the left-right dimension, the economic crisis in the 
EU provides an important opportunity to examine political representation in terms of 
whether and how party positioning on left-right ideology has changed in the context of 
shifts in the median voter. As Giger et al. have noted: ‘The Great Recession is a 
particularly fruitful and importance instance for studying the effect of variation in the 
macro-economic context on responsiveness’ (2016: 3). Accordingly, this study similarly 
shares scholarly ‘interest in the capacity of representation of parties in times of dire 
economic crisis’ (Giger et al. 2016: 3). 
This article makes two important contributions. First, it extends the literature 
examining how, over time and across countries, external pressures and domestic opinion 
have shaped party positioning and responsiveness (Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010; 
Ward et al. 2011; Steiner and Martin 2012; Ezrow and Hellwig 2014; Ward et al. 2015). 
Second, this article contributes to the emerging literature focusing on how the economic 
crisis has impacted political representation and party-citizen links in the EU, particularly 
those countries in southern Europe which have been most affected in terms of the 
severity of the economic dislocation and its impact on domestic politics (Freire et al. 
2014; Karyotis et al. 2014; Kreisi 2014; Belchior et al. 2016). It provides the first 
robust, cross-national analysis of how the economic crisis has affected party 
responsiveness to the median voter on the left-right dimension in the EU. It examines 
changes in party responsiveness on the left-right dimension in EU member states 
between 2002 and 2015. In so doing, it advances the under-researched area of how 
external factors, including economic integration, ‘inﬂuence party responsiveness to 
changes in voter preferences’ (Ezrow and Hellwig 2014: 817).   
The paper is structured as follows. First, it develops the key themes of 
responsibility and responsiveness faced by parties within the context of the European 
economic crisis. Second, it reviews existing research looking at parties’ positional 
responsiveness in the context of citizens’ preferences and external economic pressures, 
deriving hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. Third, the data sources and 
analytical procedures are explained. Fourth, the model results are presented and key 
findings discussed. Fifth, conclusions are drawn and areas for further research 
identified. 
 
The economic crisis and political parties in the EU: Responsibility and 
responsiveness 
The commitments entailed by EU membership have contributed to the convergence of 
mainstream party programmes, narrowing the policy options available to voters (Mair 
2000; Dorussen and Nanou 2006; Nanou and Dorussen 2013). Mainstream parties in the 
EU face tensions and trade-offs between the functions of responsiveness and 
responsibility (Mair 2009: 15). Governing parties can find it increasingly difficult to 
reconcile the demands of being responsive to the preferences of voters with the 
pressures of responsibility – namely, implementing policies (frequently stemming from 
the need for compliance with external constraints) aimed at addressing important social 
and economic problems and that may not be in line with the preferences of the median 
voter. As Bardi et al. observe: 
 
However, while classic democratic theory considers it desirable for the parties in 
government (and the opposition, as well) to be sympathetically responsive to 
their supporters and to public opinion and, at the same time, responsible toward 
the internal and international systemic constraints and compatibilities, these two 
roles seem to have become more difficult to reconcile and even increasingly 
incompatible (emphasis in original) (2014: 236). 
 
More specifically, responsibility requires parties to not just be responsive to the 
short-term demands of voters and other politically-relevant groups in their societies; but 
to take into account the longer-term needs of their country, as well as: 
 
the claims of audiences other than the national electoral audience, including the 
international markets that ensure their ﬁnancial alimentation, the international 
commitments and organisations that are the root of their international credibility, 
and, in the European context in particular, the heavy transnational conditions of 
constraint that are the result of a common currency and common market (Bardi 
et al. 2014: 237). 
  
These conflicting pressures between responding to citizens and implementing 
‘responsible’ policies demanded by those audiences beyond the domestic level have 
been evident for parties in some member states during the economic crisis (Mair 2013). 
Most obviously, those Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal) which 
have been (or still are) the recipients of major rescue packages provided by the ‘troika’ 
of the European Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In exchange, these countries had to accept a number of 
conditions, entailing significant fiscal retrenchment and economic reforms. Governing 
parties in these countries have been under increasing strain caused by, on the one hand, 
the responsibility for enacting austerity policies under the aegis of international 
organisations and, on the other, the need to respond to growing demands for political 
alternatives to austerity. As Hobolt and Tilley have noted ‘the external constraints on 
national governments’ room to manoeuvre have never been more obvious, especially in 
the countries facing a sovereign debt crisis’ (2016: 3).  
The situation of Greece shows how the crisis has deepened tensions between the 
responsive and responsible aspects of representative government (Gemenis and Nezi 
2015). The parties were unable to forge a parliamentary consensus in response to the 
crisis and governing parties were ‘pushed towards a “responsible” conceptualisation of 
government claiming that they could deliver a way out of the crisis, at odds with their 
representative function’ (Gemenis and Nezi 2015: 30). Moreover, as The Economist 
observed: ‘The conditions attached to the bailouts drastically reduce the government’s 
control over economic policy. For many Greeks this makes politics itself pointless’ 
(2017: 29). Similarly, Katsanidou and Otjes note that the ‘bail-out came with 
memoranda that set the main lines of Greek economic policy for the coming years’ 
(2016: 263). This reiterates how external constraints derived from the crisis – in this 
case, the bailout packages and accompanying reforms – can affect relations between 
citizens and parties, restricting how responsive parties can be to shifts in citizens’ 
preferences when they have to balance the demands of responsibility in office.  
 
Party responsiveness to the median voter on the left-right dimension: Theoretical 
expectations 
In the dynamic model of representation, a core aspect of political representation entails 
parties being responsive to changes in citizens’ preferences – that is, parties changing 
their positions in the same direction as shifts in citizens’ positions (Stimson et al. 1995; 
Erikson et al. 2002). As Ezrow et al. (2011) observe, parties can be responsive to the 
median voter (the ‘general electorate’ model) or to their own supporters (the ‘partisan 
constituency’ model). Party responsiveness to public preferences within democracies is 
affected by a range of institutional and contextual factors operating at the country level 
and by external pressures at the regional or global level (for reviews of this literature, 
see Adams 2012 and Fagerholm 2016). There has been, however, very limited research 
into the specific issue of how external factors affect party responsiveness to citizens’ 
preferences. Ezrow and Hellwig note that no previous studies have assessed the ‘the 
theoretical question of whether and how global economic ties influence party 
responsiveness to changes in voter preferences. When public opinion provides one 
signal and the global economy another, how do elites respond?’ (2014: 817). They 
expected that the responsiveness of parties to the median voter would be weaker in 
countries more deeply integrated into the global economy. Ezrow and Hellwig found 
globalization conditioned party responsiveness (particularly those parties with 
governing experience) on the left-right scale, concluding that ‘globalization enhances 
the political relevance of market actors over voters, distracting political elites from the 
electorate’ (2014: 824). 
The current crisis provides an important case for testing whether and how 
worsening economic conditions, and the bailouts in which the EU has participated, have 
affected party responsiveness in general and that of particular types of party. Based on 
the results of existing research, and informed by the work of Mair (2009, 2013) in 
relation to the demands parties face in terms of responsibility and responsiveness, 
hypotheses are specified which are then tested in the empirical analyses.  
It is expected that, within the EU, the current economic crisis has entailed parties 
facing a choice between ‘responding to voters and “responding” to markets’ (Ezrow and 
Hellwig (2014) –  the dilemma between responsibility and responsiveness. Further, the 
crisis has increased the political relevance of external actors – such as ‘troika’ of the 
European Commission, European Central Bank and the IMF, and global markets – 
compared to voters. It is expected that parties in those countries worse affected by the 
economic crisis would be less responsive to shifts in the median voter, and so be more 
likely to be responsive to external considerations pertaining to the economic crisis. 
 
Hypothesis One: The responsiveness of political parties to changes in the left-
right preferences of public opinion will be weaker in those countries with worse 
economic conditions. 
  
 Such weakened responsiveness during the crisis would be an indicator of the 
external economic pressures on parties to implement ‘responsible’ policies. As Giger et 
al. observe, ‘in bailout countries governments have to comply with the conditions 
attached to the bailout loans and have to implement the harsh austerity measures despite 
the increasing opposition among the electorate’ (2016: 7). The second hypothesis is a 
modified version of Hypothesis One, applied to a subset of countries. It is expected that 
party responsiveness will be more affected within the particular subset of Eurozone 
member states worst impacted by the economic crisis, which have had recourse to 
bailout programmes, and which clearly have experienced a more stringent set of 
external constraints on domestic policy. As Ward et al. observe: ‘If a supranational body 
sets the policy, parties are no longer free to offer alternatives to that policy’ (2015: 
1231). In short, parties in these countries have had much less leeway to shape economic 
policy in response to the crisis (Giger et al. 2016). The following hypothesis is 
specified:  
 
Hypothesis Two: The responsiveness of political parties to changes in the left-
right preferences of public opinion will be weaker in those countries which have 
participated in external bailout programmes during the crisis. 
 
The tension between responsiveness and responsibility varies across parties. It is 
particularly acute for parties in government during the economic crisis. These are the 
parties that need to respond to external constraints and implement policies in very 
difficult circumstances to address the crisis. Ezrow and Hellwig (2014) argued that 
parties would not respond in a uniform way faced with the conflicting pressures of 
economic constraints and the demands of voters. They expected that parties that had the 
responsibility of office would deem external economic considerations more salient than 
citizens’ preferences (2014: 818), finding that ‘parties with governing experience do not 
respond systematically to citizen demands in open economics’ (2014: 825). Moreover, 
as Rose has observed, ‘a governing party’s attempt to manage its national economy is 
greatly constrained by transnational influence’ (2014: 254).  
The literature on the EU and party convergence has shown that it tends to be 
mainstream parties – often with governing experience, or aspiring to office – that have 
converged programmatically, particularly on economic policy, responding to the 
external constraints of EU membership and legislative outputs (Hix 2003; Dorussen and 
Nanou 2006; Nanou and Dorussen 2013; Ward et al. 2015). Based on these insights, it 
is expected that parties in government during the economic crisis will face the most 
acute trade-off between responsibility and responsiveness (Mair 2009, 2013), and will 
be more likely than parties not in government to prioritise responsibility over 
responsiveness. As Bardi et al. note: it is generally historical and established parties that 
‘tend to present themselves as primarily “responsible” parties’, and this seems to apply 
most clearly to incumbent parties (2014: 243). External constraints arising from the 
economic situation will be more salient for parties in office during the crisis.  
 
Hypothesis Three: During the crisis, parties which are in government will be 
less responsive to changes in the left-right position of the median voter than 
parties not in government.  
 
The next section sets out how these hypotheses are tested, discussing the data sources 
used and analytical procedures followed. 
 
Data and methods 
The data on party positions come from the Manifestos Project (MARPOR) dataset 
(Volkens et al. 2016), a continuation of the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et 
al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The MARPOR dataset contains information about 
the content of party manifestos. The MARPOR dataset contains information on more 
than 1000 parties from over 50 countries, covering the period from 1945 to the present 
day. The main reason for using the MARPOR dataset is because party manifestos 
provide the most direct and complete view of party official positions on different issues. 
Users of the MARPOR data have argued that these advantages compensate for the issue 
of reliability identified in the literature (Budge 2013; Benoit et al. 2009; Mikhaylov et 
al. 2012).  
Since the focus is on EU countries and given the availability of data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 onwards, a subset of MARPOR data is used 
corresponding to national elections held in member states between 2002-2015. In total, 
this encompasses 27 countries (excluding Malta), 91 different elections, and 294 parties, 
which provides a total of 651 party-election observations. This total is, however, 
affected by the requirement for at least four election observations per party (in order to 
compute, at least, three shifts in party positions, and one of them to build the lagged 
dependent variable included in the analyses); and the need for party observations to be 
matched with corresponding data for the positions of citizens (see Table A2 in the 
Supplementary File). The final number for the analyses is 180 party-election 
observations for 15 countries. The full list of countries, parties and elections included in 
the analysis is provided in Table A1 in the Supplementary File.  
 
Measurement of the dependent and independent variables  
The analysis focuses on party responsiveness to the median on the left-right dimension. 
The focus on the left-right dimension is motivated both by the central concern with this 
aspect of positional representation in existing research (Adams et al. 2009; Haupt 2010; 
Ward et al. 2011; Ward et al. 2015) and its core role in structuring party competition 
and citizens’ preferences in European democracies.  
The operationalisation of the dependent variable relies on estimates of party left-
right positions from MARPOR, and follows the procedures set out in Laver and Budge 
(1992).1 The MARPOR left-right positional scores range from -100 to +100. These 
scores were rescaled from 0 to 10 (where 0 represent the most left-wing position and 10 
represents the most right-wing position), to match the 0-10 scale used for citizens’ left-
right self-placements from the ESS. The dependent variable used in the analysis 
measures the shifts in party positions between election t and election t-1 on the left-right 
axis (MARPOR: Rilet – Rilet-1). A negative sign indicates a shift to the left; a positive 
sign shows a shift to the right. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable are 
reported in Table A3 in the Supplementary File. 
Regarding the independent variables, three variables were used to account for 
the effects of the economic crisis on responsiveness. To examine how parties responded 
to the worsening economic situation, the annual percentage change in gross domestic 
product (GDP) was utilised as a general indicator of a country’s economic 
performance .2 This operationalization was chosen – and not, for instance, changes in 
GDP between elections or the average GDP growth during the period – since it is 
assumed that, when elaborating their manifestos, parties take into account the salience 
of more recent economic developments (using the average GDP growth or changes 
between elections could show more favourable images of the current economic 
situation). This measure is constructed as lagged variable, based on the assumption that 
parties usually develop their manifestos within a reasonable time span before an election 
(Dolezal et al. 2012; Däubler 2012).3  
The GDP variable captures the effect of changing economic conditions on party 
responsiveness. In addition, the analyses included a dummy variable (Crisis period) to 
capture any effects since the onset of the crisis on party responsiveness. This Crisis 
period variable differentiates national elections occurring before and after January 1st 
2009. The crisis became a global recession (in terms of the objective definition set by 
the International Monetary Fund - a general decline in annual world real-GDP per 
capita) in 2009 (IMF, 2009). January 2009 is used as the dividing line between the two 
periods, so all national elections occurring after that date are classified as occurring in 
the crisis period.4 A third variable aims to capture the specific effects of the crisis in 
those countries worst affected which were forced to resort to external financial 
assistance programmes provided by the EU and international organisations. A dummy 
variable, Conditionality, captures those countries and periods subject to any financial 
assistance programmes.5  
To examine responsiveness to public opinion, the models include shifts in the 
positions of citizens on the left-right dimension. For this variable, data are taken from 
different rounds of the ESS. The ESS’s core module of questions offers a consistent 
measure of citizens’ self-positioning on a left-right scale.6 The operationalization of the 
public opinion shift variable used in the analyses is the mean self-position of citizens on 
the 0-10 left-right scale between ESS round t and t-1 by country/party and election.7 
The ESS round (t) preceding each election year was used, considering the fieldwork 
period for each country. This means that if an election took place in March 2004, but the 
fieldwork of round two (2004) in that country was carried out from September 2004 to 
January 2005, data are used from round one (2002). This decision has a limitation – in 
using citizen data observations are lost because some elections in 2002 took place 
before the first ESS round. However, the advantages of this choice outweigh this 
limitation. Firstly, it better addresses the problem of endogeneity in citizens’ positions, 
because using post-election data risk these being affected by the previous electoral 
campaign. Secondly, and related to this, ESS information on citizens’ positions is 
probably prior or contemporary to the drafting of party manifestos, as the average 
number of days between election day and the mid-fieldwork date was 328.  
To capture the effect of the crisis on party left-right responsiveness to shifts in 
the mean voter’s positions, the models included the corresponding interactions between 
the variables measuring public opinion shifts and the three economic crisis measures 
(GDP growth, crisis period, and conditionality). 
The literature on party responsiveness – in general or in focusing on economic 
integration – has also demonstrated the effects of specific party characteristics on 
parties’ policy shifts (Adams et al. 2009; Ezrow et al. 2011; Ward et al. 2011; Haupt 
2010). Following this literature and in accordance with Hypothesis 3, alternative 
estimations included a dummy variable Incumbent, which identifies parties in office 
during the electoral period.8 Existing studies have demonstrated that variation in party 
system characteristic - over time and across countries - can affect policy linkages 
between parties and citizens (Budge and McDonald, 2007; Ezrow 2007). This is 
operationalised as a variable measuring the Effective number of parties (Laakso and 
Taagepera 1979). The Effective number of parties variable was calculated from the 
MARPOR data to capture the effects of changes in the institutional system in the same 
country across time (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), as a country fixed-effects estimator 
was used. A higher effective number of parties is associated with increased dispersal of 
party positions (Nanou and Dorussen 2013), which could impact on individual party 
responsiveness. A variable (Social democratic) was included to control for the effects of 
the ideological position of this type of party. The economic crisis potentially presents a 
‘unique window of opportunity’ for social democratic parties to increase their electoral 
competitiveness by diverging from centre-right parties, particularly concerning defence 
of welfare provision (Bremer, forthcoming). Alternatively, social democratic parties 
will arguably have more reason than their centre-right competitors to signal their 
commitment to implementing austerity policies in response to the crisis, in order to 
establish competence on an issue where they have traditionally had a less favourable 
reputation (Kraft 2017). Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are 
presented in Table A3 in the Supplementary File. 
 
Model specification 
Given the small number of time periods (elections between 2002 and 2015), there is 
more of an unbalanced panel data structure compared to the time-series cross sectional 
structure often used in the party responsiveness literature. A pooled OLS estimator was 
used, with robust standard errors clustered by election to correct for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation problems9 and country fixed effects to account for bias stemming 
from unmeasured country level factors. The addition of the lagged dependent variable is 
to address the issue of serial correlation (Beck and Katz 2011). 10 
The basic model is as follows: 
 
Party_shift = Public opinion shift + Crisis Period + GDP growth + Conditionality+ 
Public opinion_shiftXeconomic conditions + Control variables + Countries 
 
(1) 
where Party_shift stands for the dependent variable (left-right), Party_shift(t-1) is the 
lagged dependent variable, and Public opinion shift represents the shifts in the median 
voter’s left-right positions. To test the hypotheses, interaction terms between shifts in 
mean citizens’ positions with economic conditions (either the crisis period variable or in 
alternative specifications with Conditionality and with GDP growth) are included in the 
models. These estimates can help to assess if parties responded differently to public 
opinion during the crisis period due to changing economic circumstances. 
 
Results and discussion 
Table 1 reports the OLS regression results with robust standard errors clustered by 
country-election with a full set of country-fixed effects. Models 1-3 report the results for 
the different models estimated for left-right ideology.11  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
The results provide support for Hypothesis 1. The positive and significant 
coefficients in the estimates for Crisis period and Public opinion shift¸ and the negative 
coefficient in the interaction between both variables in Model 1, indicate that parties 
responded differently to public opinion during the crisis period. Figure 1 offers a more 
intuitive interpretation of these effects. Before the crisis, the average marginal effect of 
a shift in public opinion (the slope of the corresponding line in Figure 1) is 1.96, while 
during the crisis the effect is -2.58. Both effects are statistically significant. Before the 
crisis parties tended to respond to the shifts in public opinion by moving in the same 
direction. However, during the crisis this pattern is reversed, with parties’ left-right 
shifts tending to differ from that of the median voter.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
This result seems in line with the findings of previous studies on party 
responsiveness in Europe for the pre-crisis period, which find parties change their 
policy stances in reaction to shifts in mean voter positions (Adams et al. 2004; Adams 
and Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow et al. 2011). The results of the coefficients for GDP 
growth (t-2), and for the interaction of this variable with Public opinion shift in Model 
2, are also statistically significant. They are represented in Figures 2a and 2b. They 
show that parties tended to shift their positions in the opposite direction from the public 
when the economic situation worsened; while they became indifferent to public opinion 
when levels of economic growth reached about 3 percent.  
 
(Figures 2a and 2b here) 
 
The interaction between Public opinion shift and Conditionality is statistically 
significant in Model 3 of Table 1. Though parties in all countries tended to be not 
responsive to public opinion shifts (on the contrary, party shifts run in the opposite 
direction), in countries subject to conditionality non-responsiveness is more 
accentuated. This is shown in Figure 3 through the steeper, negative slope of the 
average predicted marginal effects for the triple interaction in the conditionality 
countries. However, from Figure 3, it can also be seen that, in countries under 
conditionality, there is also a margin (when citizens’ shift to the right up to 0.11 points) 
where parties in countries under conditionality programmes appear to be responsive.   
 
    (Figure 3 about here) 
 
An interpretation of the results of Models 1-2 suggests that party responsiveness 
before the crisis was independent from economic factors, but that the crisis and the 
negative economic conditions associated with it have significantly eroded the level of 
responsiveness. Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed for the general left-right shifts (Model 3), 
though in Models 1 through 3 Conditionality has positively-signed and statistically-
significant coefficients – meaning that, everything else equal, parties turned towards 
more right-wing positions in countries subject to external bailout programmes.  
Hypothesis 3 stipulated that the effects of the crisis are more pronounced for 
incumbent parties. Governing parties are the ones that had to negotiate financial 
assistance programmes with EU institutions, other external organisations, and creditor 
countries. Their manifestos needed to balance the need to respond to public opinion 
with a responsible stance towards the creditors’ demands, and the requirement to signal 
to the markets that they are committed to prescribed austerity measures to address the 
crisis. Models 4-6 in Table 1 were estimated, which examined the conditioning effect of 
governing status on party responsiveness to public opinion on the left-right dimension 
before and during the crisis period.  
In Model 4, in addition to the significant interaction between Crisis and Public 
opinion shift, the interaction between Crisis and Incumbent is statistically significant. 
Though the main effects for both variables are not significant, the interaction could be 
interpreted as showing that, during the crisis, parties in government moved significantly 
to the right compared with opposition parties. The non-significant coefficient for the 
interaction of Incumbent x Public opinion shift x Crisis period demonstrates that this 
change is not a response to shifts in public opinion.12 The result from a joint F test 
shows that the mediating impact of the crisis period was not statistically significant for 
incumbent parties (F = 0.49, p = 0.615).  
The triple interaction is significant in Model 5. The results from a joint F test 
shows that the mediating effect of economic growth is statistically significant for 
incumbent parties (F = 3.73, p = 0.062). However, neither the main effects for 
Incumbent and GDP nor any of the two-way interactions between the variables of 
interest are statistically significant. Figures 4a and 4b suggest that, the more the 
economic situation deteriorated, incumbent parties moved in the opposite direction to 
that of public opinion. 
 
(Figure 4a and Figure 4b about here) 
 
Model 6 tests Hypothesis 3 for those countries subject to financial assistance 
programmes. As in the previous model, the main effects of Public opinion shift and 
Conditionality are statistically significant. The same applies to the Conditionality x 
Incumbent interaction and the three-way interaction with Public opinion shift. The result 
from a joint F test carried out for the three-way interaction shows that conditionality had 
a statistically significant mediating impact (F = 15.4, p = .000). Figure 5 shows the 
differential behaviour of incumbent parties in countries subject to conditionality – they 
tended to be much less responsive compared with incumbent parties in other countries, 
while for the other parties there is no significant difference. 
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 
Overall, the results indicate that the decline in party responsiveness in countries subject 
to financial assistance programmes demonstrates the influence of external pressures on 
parties’ left-right positioning. The results also show that this reduced responsiveness is 
mainly a matter of degree, since parties in countries not subject to conditionality display 
a similar, if less pronounced, pattern during the crisis period. In line with Ezrow and 
Hellwig (2014), this finding was particularly noticeable amongst parties in government, 
highlighting the greater salience of responsibility compared to responsiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has provided new findings into the impact of a significant period of 
economic crisis on parties’ positional responsiveness. The main results showed that, as 
expected, the crisis has made parties less responsive to public opinion on the left-right 
dimension: they have moved in the opposite direction to the shifts of the median voter. 
The effects were more pronounced for incumbent parties: they moved significantly to 
the right compared with parties not in office. In the time period covered by the data 
(2002-2015), with a sustained economic crisis and growing political contestation over 
the integration process in member states, the findings may indicate some changes in 
how parties respond to citizens. In this period, parties – as Mair argues (2009, 2013) – 
are caught between the conflicting demands for responsiveness to citizens who shifted 
to the left during this period asking for an alternative to – or at least an easing of – 
austerity, and the responsibility to reform and retrench as demanded by external 
creditors, the EU and the IMF. The results indicate that parties are not only less 
responsive to their citizens due to worsening economic conditions but also due to the 
realisation of an additional crisis, the crisis of sovereignty taking place at the same time. 
During the crisis, parties in member states have therefore been paying greater heed to 
‘the claims of audiences other than the national electoral audience’ (Bardi et al. 2014: 
237). 
Further research can examine the impact of the economic crisis on the 
polarization of citizens’ preferences and how this might affect responsiveness, which, 
according to the data, seems to have been greatly reduced during the first decade of the 
21st century. This includes looking at party-voter linkages on specific areas of policy, 
disaggregating the broader left-right dimension focused on here. Parties might not only 
be constrained by EU institutions and the markets, which negatively affect 
responsiveness, but they also might find it more difficult to read citizens’ preferences, 
which could also affect responsiveness. More specifically, given that a small number of 
cases examined were under conditionality, case studies could examine in greater depth 
the conditions under which financial assistance programmes pose constraints on party 
responsiveness in particular countries.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Adjusted means of party shifts on the left right dimension, as a function of 
public opinion shift and crisis period (Model 1 in Table 1). 
  
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 
10, 25, the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99.
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Figure 2a Adjusted means of party shifts on the left-right dimension, as a function of 
public opinion shift and GDP growth (t-2) (Model 2 in Table 1). 
  
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 
10, 25, the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99. The three lines for GDP growth (t-
2) represent the minimum, the mean, and the maximum levels of the variable. 
 
Figure 2b Average marginal effects of average public opinion shift on party left-right 
shift, conditioned on GDP growth (t-2) (Model 2 in Table 1) 
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Figure 3. Adjusted means of party shifts on the left-right dimension, as a function of 
public opinion shift and conditionality (Model 3 in Table 1). 
  
 
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 
10, 25, the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99. 
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Figure 4a Adjusted means of party shifts on the left-right dimension, as a function of 
public opinion shift, GDP, and incumbency (Model 5 in Table 1). 
  
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 
10, 25, the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99. The three lines for GDP growth (t-
2) represent the minimum, the mean, and the maximum levels of the variable. 
 
 
Figure 4b Average marginal effects of average public opinion shift on party left-right 
shift, conditioned on GDP growth (t-2) and incumbency (Model 5 in Table 1). 
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Figure 5 Adjusted means of party shifts on the left-right dimension, as a function of public opinion shift, conditionality, and incumbency (Model 
6 in Table 1). 
 
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 10, 25, the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99. The 
three lines for GDP growth (t-2) represent the minimum, the mean, and the maximum levels of the variable. 
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Table 1. Multivariate analysis of parties’ ideological left-right shifts before and during the crisis (2002-2015) 
 All parties Incumbent parties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public opinion shift 1.96*** -2.32*** -1.63*** 1.50 -2.17*** -1.86** 
 (0.646) (0.453) (0.607) (0.967) (0.637) (0.827) 
Crisis period 0.30*** 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.23 0.24 
 (0.089) (0.146) (0.219) (0.152) (0.146) (0.166) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.04*** -0.03** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.023) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) 
Conditionality 0.97*** 0.77** 0.82** 0.98*** 0.83** 0.54* 
 (0.213) (0.308) (0.401) (0.212) (0.307) (0.289) 
Crisis period x Public opinion shift -4.54***      
 (0.692)      
GDP growth (t-2) x Public opinion shift  0.33***     
  (0.085)     
Conditionality x Public opinion shift   -1.05*    
   (1.200)    
Incumbent 0.15 0.11 0.11 -0.36 0.13 0.03 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.124) (0.312) (0.127) (0.112) 
Public opinion shift x Incumbent    1.84 -0.42 0.69 
    (1.854) (0.875) (1.279) 
Crisis period x Public opinion shift    -4.13***   
    (0.963)   
Crisis period x Incumbent    0.65*   
    (0.327)   
Crisis period x Public opinion shift x Incumbent    -1.49   
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    (2.179)   
GDP growth (t-2) x Public opinion shift     0.20  
     (0.124)  
GDP growth (t-2) x Incumbent     -0.05  
     (0.030)  
GDP growth (t-2) x Public opinion shift x 
Incumbent 
    0.38*  
     (0.199)  
Conditionality x Public opinion shift      1.06 
      (0.771) 
Conditionality x Incumbent      1.54*** 
      (0.357) 
Conditionality x Public opinion shift x Incumbent      -5.42*** 
      (1.348) 
Social democratic 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05 
 (0.155) (0.156) (0.144) (0.177) (0.181) (0.176) 
Effective number of parties -0.40*** -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.44*** 
 (0.075) (0.090) (0.136) (0.071) (0.083) (0.083) 
Party shift (t-1) -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.44*** 
 (0.135) (0.140) (0.065) (0.143) (0.139) (0.138) 
Constant 0.41 0.83* 0.63 0.51* 0.75* 0.36 
 (0.302) (0.450) (0.569) (0.300) (0.424) (0.378) 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.31 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country and election in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. The individual country 
dummy estimates are not reported in the table but are available upon request. 
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Supplementary File: Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1 Countries, elections and parties included in the analyses 
 
Country election Party 
Belgium Ecologists (ECOLO) 
1999, 2003, 2007, 2010 Green! (Groen!) 
 Socialist Party Different (sp.a) 
 Francophone Socialist Party (PS) 
 Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (openVLD) 
 Reform Movement (MR) 
 Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V) 
 Christian Social Party (PSC) 
 New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) 
Czech Republic Green Party (SZ) 
2002, 2006, 2010, 2013 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) 
 Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) 
 Civic Democratic Party (ODS) 
 
Christian and Democratic Union - Czech People's 
Party (KDU-ČSL) 
Denmark Red-Green Unity List (EL) 
2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 Socialist People’s Party (SF) 
 Social Democratic Party (SD) 
 Radical Party (RV) 
 Liberals (V) 
 Conservative People’s Party (KF) 
 Danish People’s Party (DF) 
Estonia Social Democratic Party (SDE) 
2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 Estonian Center Party (K) 
 Estonian Reform Party (ER) 
 Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) 
 Estonian People’s Union (ERL) 
Finland Green Union (VL) 
1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 Left Wing Alliance (VAS) 
 Finnish Social Democrats (SSDP) 
 Christian Democrats in Finland (KD) 
 National Coalition (KK) 
 Finnish Centre (SK) 
 True Finns (PS) 
 Swedish People’s Party (RKP/SFP) 
Germany Alliance‘90/Greens (90/Greens) 
2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 
 Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
 
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union 
(CDU/CSU) 
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Greece Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 
2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 
(May), 2012 (June) Communist Party of Greece (KKE) 
 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 
 New Democracy (ND) 
Hungary 
Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats - 
Hungarian Civic (FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP) 
2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) 
 Hungarian Social Democratic Party (MSzDP) 
 
Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic 
Union (FiDeSz-MPSz) 
Netherlands Green Left (GL) 
2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012 Socialist Party (SP) 
 Labour Party (PvdA) 
 Democrats‘66 (D’66) 
 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 
 Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 
 Christian Union (CU) 
 Party of Freedom (PVV) 
 Party for the Animals (PvdD) 
 Reformed Political Party (SGP) 
Poland Civic Platform (PO) 
2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 Law and Justice (PiS) 
 Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) 
 German Minority (MN) 
Portugal Ecologist Party ‘The Greens' (PEV) 
2002, 2005, 2009. 2011 Left Bloc (BE) 
 Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) 
 Socialist Party (PS) 
 Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
 Social Democratic Center-Popular Party (CDS-PP) 
Slovakia Direction-Social Democracy (Smer) 
2002, 2006, 2010, 2012 Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) 
 
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democartic 
Party (SDKÚ-DS) 
 Slovak National Party (SNS) 
 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 
Slovenia Social Democratic Party (SD) 
2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) 
 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) 
 Slovenian People's Party (SLS) 
 New Slovenian Christian People’s Party (Nsi) 
 Slovenian National Party (SNS) 
 Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (Desus) 
Spain United Left (IU) 
38 
 
2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) 
 Popular Party (PP) 
 Convergence and Union (CiU) 
 Basque Nationalist Party (PNV/EAJ) 
 Basque Solidarity (EA) 
 Catalan Republican Left (ERC) 
 Canarian Coalition (CC) 
 Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) 
United Kingdom Labour Party (Labour) 
2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 Liberal Democrats (LibDems) 
 Conservative Party (Conservatives) 
Note: Election years in italics indicate the years used to compute the lagged dependent 
variable and are not matched with ESS data. The dependent variable is party position shifts 
between election year t and t-1. 
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Table A2 Matching between MARPOR election years and ESS rounds 
 
 
Election 
date 
ESS 
round 
Start date of 
the 
fieldwork 
End date of 
the 
fieldwork 
Days from 
election to start 
of fieldwork 
Days from 
election to end 
of fieldwork 
Belgium 18-may-03 2002 01-Oct-02 30-Apr-03 229 18 
 10-jun-07 2006 23-Oct-06 19-Feb-07 230 111 
 13-jun-10 2008 13-Nov-08 20-Mar-09 577 450 
Czech Republic 3-jun-06 2004 01-Oct-04 13-Dec-04 610 537 
 29-may-10 2008 08-Jun-09 08-Jul-09 355 325 
 26-oct-13 2012 09-Jan-13 11-Mar-13 290 229 
Denmark 8-feb-05 2004 09-Oct-04 31-Jan-05 122 8 
 13-nov-07 2006 19-Sep-06 02-May-07 420 195 
 15-sep-11 2010 20-Sep-10 31-Jan-11 360 227 
Estonia 4-mar-07 2006 25-Oct-06 21-May-07 130 -78 
 6-mar-11 2010 10-Oct-10 28-May-11 147 -83 
 1-mar-15 2014 07-Sep-14 29-Dec-14 175 62 
Finland 16-mar-03 2002 09-Sep-02 10-Dec-02 188 96 
 18-mar-07 2006 18-Sep-06 20-Dec-06 181 88 
 17-abr-11 2010 13-Sep-10 30-Dec-10 216 108 
Germany 18-sep-05 2004 26-Aug-04 16-Jan-05 388 245 
 27-sep-09 2008 27-Aug-08 31-Jan-09 396 239 
 22-sep-13 2012 06-Sep-12 22-Jan-13 381 243 
Greece 7-mar-04 2002 29-Jan-03 15-Mar-03 403 358 
 16-sep-07 2004 10-Jan-05 20-Mar-05 979 910 
 4-oct-09 2008 15-Jul-09 20-Nov-09 81 -47 
 6-may-12 2010 06-May-11 05-Jul-11 366 306 
 17-jun-12 2010 06-May-11 05-Jul-11 408 348 
Hungary 9-abr-06 2004 02-Apr-05 31-May-05 372 313 
 11-abr-10 2008 20-Feb-09 20-Apr-09 415 356 
 6-abr-14 2012 10-Nov-12 17-Feb-13 512 413 
Netherlands 22-ene-03 2002 01-Sep-02 24-Feb-03 143 -33 
 22-nov-06 2004 11-Sep-04 19-Feb-05 802 641 
 9-jun-10 2008 08-Sep-08 26-Jun-09 639 348 
 12-sep-12 2010 27-Sep-10 02-Apr-11 716 529 
Poland 25-sep-05 2004 10-Oct-04 22-Dec-04 350 277 
 21-oct-07 2006 02-Oct-06 13-Dec-06 384 312 
 9-oct-11 2010 01-Oct-10 06-Feb-11 373 245 
Portugal 20-feb-05 2004 15-Oct-04 17-Mar-05 128 -25 
 27-sep-09 2008 09-Oct-08 08-Mar-09 353 203 
 5-jun-11 2010 11-Oct-10 23-Mar-11 237 74 
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Slovakia 17-jun-06 2004 04-Oct-04 12-Dec-04 621 552 
 12-jun-10 2008 17-Nov-08 15-Feb-09 572 482 
 10-mar-12 2010 29-Oct-10 28-Feb-11 498 376 
Slovenia 3-oct-04 2002 17-Oct-02 30-Nov-02 717 673 
 21-sep-08 2006 18-Oct-06 04-Dec-06 704 657 
 4-dic-11 2010 20-Oct-10 31-Jan-11 410 307 
Spain 14-mar-04 2002 19-Nov-02 20-Feb-03 481 388 
 9-mar-08 2006 25-Oct-06 04-Mar-07 501 371 
 20-nov-11 2010 11-Apr-11 24-Jul-11 223 119 
United Kingdom 5-may-05 2004 27-Sep-04 16-Mar-05 220 50 
 6-may-10 2008 01-Sep-08 19-Jan-09 612 472 
 7-may-15 2014 01-Sep-14 25-Feb-15 248 71 
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Table A3 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main and supplementary 
analysis 
 
Variable name 
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Party shift 180 -0.02 0.87 -3.10 6.20 
Independent variables 
Party shift (t-1) 180 -0.15 0.91 -3.10 6.20 
Public opinion shift 180 0.00 0.16 -0.57 0.50 
Crisis period 180 0.73 0.45 0 1 
GDP growth (t-2) 180 0.01 4.58 -14.72 5.66 
Conditionality 180 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Incumbent 180 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Social democratic 180 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Effective number of parties 180 4.93 1.77 1.98 9.13 
Independent variables in supplementary analysis 
Crisis period (t-1) 180 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Unemployment 180 8.27 3.67 2.80 18.10 
Inequality 180 28.32 3.64 23.09 35.06 
GDP growth (t-1) 180 0.75 3.65 -9.13 6.94 
GDP growth (t-2) change 180 -2.17 6.36 -24.10 16.29 
GDP growth (t-1) change 180 -1.31 4.87 -11.97 8.33 
Governing experience 180 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Governing experience PM 180 0.46 0.50 0 1 
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Figure A1 Annual rate of GDP growth per country, 2002-2015 
 
Note: the red line indicates the data for 2009. 
Source: World Bank National Accounts data. 
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Figure A2 Average public opinion shift on the left-right dimension by country, 2002-2015 
Source: European Social Survey. 
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Figure A3 Adjusted means of party shifts on the left-right dimension, as a function of public 
opinion shift, crisis period, and governing experience. 
 
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 10, 25, 
the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99. 
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Figure A4 Adjusted means of party shifts on the left-right dimension, as a function of public 
opinion shift, crisis period, and PM governing experience. 
 
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 10, 25, 
the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99. 
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Figure A5 Adjusted means of party shifts on the left-right dimension, as a function of public 
opinion shift, crisis period, and incumbency. 
 
 
Note: Points on the public opinion shift axis are set, from left to right, at percentiles 1, 10, 25, 
the mean, and the percentiles 75, 90, and 99. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
-.57 -.2 -.08 0 .09.14 .5 -.57 -.2 -.08 0 .09.14 .5
Incumbent=0 Incumbent=1
Crisis period=0 Crisis period=1
L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 (
P
a
rt
y
 l
e
ft
-r
ig
h
t 
s
h
if
ts
)
Public opinion left-right shift
Predictive Margins of Crisis * Incumbentt with 95% CIs
47 
 
Notes 
1 Information about the specific MARPOR categories used to construct the dependent 
variable can be found in the corresponding codebook at the MARPOR website: 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/data/2016b/codebooks/codebook_MPDataset_MPDS2
016b.pdf. 
2 The annual change in GDP for each country during 2002-2015 is shown in Figure A1 in the 
Supplementary File. The GDP data were taken from World Bank National Accounts data and 
OECD National Accounts data files (available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). 
3 The models presented in the text include the variable GDP growth lagged two years before 
the election, in order to capture the influence of economic information on manifesto writing 
in those cases when elections take place during the first months and the most recent 
information yearly GDP data could not have been considered during manifesto development. 
Alternative models with GDP growth lagged one year produced similar results. As a 
robustness check, an alternative specification of this variable – measuring the change in 
lagged GDP growth, both with one and two-year lag, between each pair of elections – was 
used, generating a similar set of results. There were two main differences. In Model 2, the 
interaction term Public opinion shift x GPD growth shift was not significant when the change 
in the two-year lag GDP growth prior to the election is used, indicating that as the economic 
conditions worsen parties are equally unresponsive to public opinion. Also, the interaction 
term in Model 5, Incumbent x Public opinion shift x GPD growth shift, was not significant for 
the one-year and the two-year lag.  
4 Other research has used 2008 as the starting point of the crisis (Bremer, forthcoming). 
Models were re-estimated using 2008 as the cut-off point for the Crisis period variable. The 
results were similar. 
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5 The countries subject to conditionality are (in parentheses the starting year of the first 
assistance programme): Greece (2010), Hungary (2008), and Portugal (2010). The following 
programmes were included: EU balance-of-payment assistance programme: 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/balance_of_payments/index_en.htm); 
European Financial Stability Facility: 
(http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/operations/index.htm); European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism: (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/index_en.htm); and the  
European Stability Mechanism (http://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/index.htm) (all 
accessed on November 16, 2016). 
6 The text of the question is as follows: ‘In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and 
"right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left 
and 10 means the right? [0 – Left; 10 – Right]’. This question was included in all ESS rounds 
(1 to 7, 2002-2014).  
7 The country-specific data from the ESS showing the mean shifts on the left-right dimension 
between 2002-2015 are presented in Figure A2 in the Supplementary File. It is evident that, 
overall, public opinion in most countries in the sample moved in a leftwards direction 
between 2002-2015. This includes long-standing member states in western Europe – 
Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Germany – and a number of more recent entrants from eastern 
Europe, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. In contrast, average 
opinion shifted in a rightwards direction in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain, 
Portugal, and Slovakia. This variable picture of public opinion shifting not systemically but 
rather in different directions in different national contexts has been found in other research 
(Tillman 2016: 124). 
8 Data on incumbency were taken from Seki and Williams (2014), and were extended to 
encompass the most recent years. As alternative specifications, two variables were 
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constructed using the dataset by Seki and Williams (2014) – one differentiating parties with 
and without any prior governing experience, and one distinguishing the subset of parties with 
governing experience that have held the prime ministerial office. The model results using 
these different specifications were similar for all models with one main exception. In Model 
4, the triple interaction Governing experience x Public opinion shift x Crisis period is actually 
positively-signed and statistically significant. The marginal effects show that parties with 
governing experience are slightly less non-responsive than parties without governing 
experience (see Figure A3 in the Supplementary File). 
9 Based on Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (p>0.05) (Wooldridge 2009). In 
contrast, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity detected this 
problem in all models (p<0.05). 
10 As Ezrow and Hellwig point out, the effect of economic conditions on party responsiveness 
might be just the manifestation of a ‘secular decline in parties’ tendencies to respond to 
public opinion’ (2014: 822). In this respect, models were also run including a time trend 
variable (year) to control for this. The results, however, did not substantively change. To 
acknowledge concerns in the literature over the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
(Plümper et al. 2005), the models were re-estimated without the lagged dependent variable, 
producing a similar set of results. There is one main difference in Model 3, where the 
interaction Public opinion shift x Conditionality is no longer statistically significant. 
11 Additional models were estimated which included alternative variables -  unemployment 
and inequality – to capture the effects of the economic crisis. Existing research dealing with 
the effects of the economic crisis on public opinion has used the annual rate of 
unemployment as an indicator (Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Roth et al. 2016; Serricchio et al. 
2013; Braun and Tausendpfund 2014). Unemployment data were taken from World Bank 
national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files (available at: 
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https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS). The net Gini index was used to 
capture the social consequences of the economic crisis, in terms of variation in the level of 
inequality within societies (Solt 2016). To produce comparable results to those captured by 
the two-year lag of the GDP growth variable, the rate of unemployment and the inequality 
index scores two years before each election were used. Irrespective of whether 
unemployment or inequality was used, the results were similar. However, in the re-estimated 
Model 2, where in the interactions unemployment or inequality were substituted for growth, 
party responsiveness to public opinion shifts is not mediated by levels of unemployment or 
inequality. There also an exception in Model 5, where the triple interaction term Incumbent x 
Public opinion shift x Inequality is positively-signed and statistically significant. The 
marginal effects show that for lower levels of inequality, incumbent parties do not respond to 
citizens’ shifts to the right. The marginal effect figures are available upon request from the 
authors. 
12 From examining the marginal effects, incumbency does not significantly influence the 
patterns of relationship between party shifts and public opinion shifts before and during the 
crisis. The figures showing the marginal effects are included in the Supplementary File 
(Figure A5). 
 
